
Globalization of Security and Europe

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In order to consider Globalization of Security and Europe, let us start with what we understand by globalization. Joseph Nye defines globalization as “worldwide networks of interdependence.” He goes on to explain military globalization as consisting of “networks of interdependence in which force or the threat of force is employed.” He cites as examples the world wars of the twentieth century and the Cold War.¹

So military globalization is not a 21st century phenomenon. If we look back, several European countries deployed forces world wide, as far back as late 15th Century, and their imperial conquest of the non-European world, reaching its height in the late 19th and early 20th century, can be seen as one form of globalization.

The two world wars of 20th century were also fought around the globe. European forces fought in the Middle East and in Asia. That these two wars, beginning on the European continent, became global wars was mainly a result of the empires the Europeans had built in the preceding centuries. It was also a result of non-European nations, typically Japan but also China to a certain extent, entering the worldwide network of security interdependence in the early 20th century.

The globalization of the Cold War took a different form. It was fought in a global theater mainly by the United States and the Soviet Union. Europe only played a regional role on the European continent. This was partly because they slowly lost their world wide imperial role through independence of former colonies, and also because Europe was thought to be the most important theater of East-West confrontation. The image of the Soviet tanks rolling through the German plains was a dominant image of the possible opening of the Third World War. The vast conventional weapons of West Germany and other European nations were supposed to be used on the European continent, so the European powers, especially West Germany hardly needed any power projection capabilities. Although Great Britain and France came to possess nuclear weapons, theirs did not become part of the elaborate balancing of nuclear forces between the United States and Soviet Union in the so-called “mutually balanced destruction” or “balance of terror.”

“Central, Eastern and South-Eastern European Era” for Europe.

It was only after the end of the Cold War that Europeans again started to focus on “global threats.” But this only happened gradually. The NATO London Declaration of July 1990 is usually taken as a starting point of the “transformation” of NATO. But when we read this text today, it is mainly concerned about the transition of Europe from being divided between two

alliances to a Europe which was choosing to be “whole and free.” It was declared that “NATO will prepare a new Allied military strategy moving away from “forward defence” where appropriate, towards a reduced forward presence and modifying “flexible response” to reflect a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons.”² So what was considered at that time was only a modification of the military strategies that existed during the Cold War.

The first concrete result of the transformation of NATO strategy was “the alliance’s strategic Concept” agreed in Rome, November 1991.³ The heads of the governments recognized that the security environment in which the North Atlantic Alliance seeks to achieve its objectives had radically improved. There was no longer threat of a surprise attack in Central Europe. They stated that “Risks to Allied security are less likely to result from calculated aggression against the territory of the Allies, but rather from the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many countries in central and eastern Europe” They were particularly concerned about the instability in the Soviet Union with large nuclear arsenal. For the first time, concerns about global issues were announced in point 12.

“12. Alliance security must also take account of the global context. Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disruption of the flow of vital resources and actions of terrorism and sabotage.”

But at this stage, NATO was more concerned about instabilities in former Warsaw Pact countries than global terrorism.

The Rome “strategic concept” also emphasized that NATO should henceforth take “a broad approach to security,” meaning that it should emphasize the political side of the alliance activities, such as dialogue and cooperation. But the adversary of these dialogue and cooperation was the former Warsaw Pact countries.

So the period between 1989 and 2001 could be termed, “Central, Eastern and South-Eastern European Era” for European security.

There was the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the enlargement debate of NATO, and there was the Yugoslav Conflict.

NATO started going “out of area” and became militarily active in the Balkans. NATO started the process of Partnership for Peace (PfP) and subsequently enlarged into Central and Eastern Europe. NATO initiated the NACC (North Atlantic Cooperation Council) in order to foster dialogue with the former Warsaw Pact countries and this still exists in the form of EAPC (Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council). But it was still very much a “Euro-Atlantic” organization, focused on the European continent.

In these early days of Post-Cold War Europe, there were expectations that CSCE, EU and perhaps also WEU (Western European Union) would play important roles in the security of Europe.

The CSCE adopted the Charter of Paris in 1990, became OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) in 1994, and developed extensive organs including Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (in Warsaw), a Conflict Prevention Centre (in Vienna), a High Commissioner on National Minorities (in The Hague), and a Court of Conciliation and Arbitration (in Geneva).

Article J.4 of the Treaty on European Union of the Maastricht Treaty (signed on 7th February 1992), which established the common security and foreign policy (CFSP), stated that “The union requests the Western European Union (WEU), which is an integral part of the development of the Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications. The Council shall, in agreement with the institutions of the WEU, adopt the necessary practical arrangements.”

So there was a period when it was thought that WEU would be activated to play an important role in European security.

In the mid-1990s, WEU had four statuses of membership: members, observers, associate members and associate partners. Western Europeans tried to buy time by making Central and Eastern European countries “associate partners” of WEU so they could negotiate about NATO membership. In May 1994, Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria and the three Baltic countries were declared “associate partners” of WEU. This closely followed the invitation to PFP by NATO in January 1994.

But OSCE and WEU were soon overshadowed by NATO during the course of the Yugoslav conflict. It was only after heavy bombing by NATO in August 1995 that peace in Bosnia was achieved. After the Bosnian experience, the European powers became concerned about the capability gap that was obvious between them and the Americans. From this came the initiative of France and United Kingdom at Saint Malo in December 1998. The two heads of state agreed that “the European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage,” and for this purpose,” the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises.” They once again placed the EU in the centre of European security by declaring that “Europeans will operate within the institutional framework of the European Union”⁴

What the Europeans had in mind when they talked about their capabilities were the so called “Petersberg Tasks.” This was originally stated by the Petersberg Declaration of WEU in June 1992. They included “humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.”⁵ These expressions have been followed by subsequent EU treaties, and the present Treaty on European Union adopts the

same expression in Article J.7.2 of Treaty of Amsterdam (2 October 1997) and Article 17.2. of Nice Treaty (26 February 2001) : “Questions referred to in this Article shall include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.”

Typical operations of the “Petersberg tasks” were thought to be conflict and crisis management and peacekeeping or peacemaking operations in the Balkans. So throughout the 1990s, European focus was on the periphery of Europe and on the Balkans in particular.

There were some suggestions at this stage to make the Atlantic alliance into a global partnership. Typical was the book *America and Europe: A Partnership for a New Era* edited by David C. Gompert and F. Stephan Larrabee of Rand Corporation.⁶ In this book they called upon Europe to “expand its sense of interests, to take on more responsibility, and to fulfill its stated aspiration to be a global actor.” This book came out in 1997 but at that time, the proposal found little resonance.

Another shock and realization of European incapacity was needed before the Europeans adopted European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) at the Cologne European Council in July 1999.⁷ It was under the strong impression made by the Kosovo intervention this year, that the Europeans became serious about their own capabilities. The Presidency council declaration stated that “the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO.”⁸ For this purpose, they decided to establish Political and Security Committee (PSC), EU military committee, EU military staff, satellite Centre, and Institute for Security Studies. At the same time, it was decided to close the WEU military staff and end its crisis management responsibilities. The member states also decided to name Javier Solana the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, pursuant to the Amsterdam Treaty (signed on October 2, 1997, and entered into force on May 1, 1999).

In December 1999, the EU stated Helsinki Headline Goals. The member states agreed to “be able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least 1 year military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 persons capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks.”⁹

These strengthening of ESDP were more regional rather than global, the operations the European leaders had in mind were crisis management and peacekeeping in the European neighborhood, where the Americans had no interest of intervening. But these structures, as they were developed, gave the EU a better possibility of reacting to more global problems.

1999 was the year of Kosovo intervention, and it was also the 50th anniversary of North Atlantic Treaty. A new strategic concept was agreed by the heads of the states convened at the

North Atlantic Council on 23rd and 24th April 1999. This was in the midst of Kosovo crisis and the main focus of the alliance was on “uncertainty and instability in and around the Euro-Atlantic area and the possibility of regional crises at the periphery of the Alliance.” Terrorism was only mentioned marginally, together with sabotage, organised crime, and the disruption of the flow of vital resources.¹⁰

So by the end of Kosovo crisis, the Europeans had become more aware of their lack of ability to manage their own affairs, but the threat they were considering to take care of was still very much regional in nature.

Kosovo was also a threshold for the American way of thinking about war-time coalitions. In the 1990s, the Americans fought several wars by coalition, starting from the Gulf War I and ending with Kosovo intervention. Especially the latter made a negative impression on the American security community about the ‘war by committee.’ So even before the coming of the Bush II administration, there were inclinations in the American defence establishment to “go it alone.”¹¹

Strategic Environment after 9.11

The strategic environment changed dramatically by the attack on September 11, 2001.

There had been terrorist attacks before, but it had not been perceived as a global network before this incident. The Europeans were especially affected by this shift in threat perception, because conventional threat on their continent had virtually vanished following the conclusion of the Balkan wars. After the stabilization of Kosovo, there were still peacekeeping missions to be sustained in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, but apart from that, the whole of Central and Eastern Europe was pacified and Russian threat had disappeared for the foreseeable future. Instead terrorism at home and abroad and the proliferation of WMD became main focal point of their security.

Joseph Nye argues in his book that the 21st century globalization is “thicker and quicker,” is closely related to the information revolution, and goes “farther, faster, cheaper and deeper.”¹² The 21st terrorists are quite unlike the 20th century threats in that they only form loose networks and do not create hierarchical organizations. They often use internet to disseminate their ideas, and these could find respondents in any part of the world. Their technology involves such everyday devices as cell phones. The know-how of bomb-making could also be disseminated via internet.

The American response to these new types of threats was to push further with the military transformation they had already started. Their tendency to construct armed forces that was small but mobile, which could quickly be deployed in any parts of the world was enhanced by

the vulnerability they felt after 9.11. The American answer to the use of information technology by the terrorist was “Network Centric Warfare.” Because they felt the need to react speedily and because network centric warfare made multinational operations even more difficult than before, their tendency was to fight the war in Afghanistan and in Iraq by only a selected countries in coalition, and to a large extent by themselves.

European response to the new threat and changes in America was mixed. On one-side, they tried to emulate America and bring about ‘transformation’ of their own armed forces. These efforts had already begun as a result of the experience of Gulf War I. The UK had presented their “Strategic Defence Review” in July 1998, The French announced to abolish conscription in 1995 and to reduce their armed forces from approximately 500,000 to 350,000. They set out five year military plans for the period of 1997-2002 in 1996. In the same year, they also announced their reform plan, “Defence Nouvelle 1997-2015.” The Germans started in earnest with their reform plan by the presentation of the Report of the Commission of former President Weizsaecker in May 2000.¹³

Following the 9.11 incident, the tendency to emphasize smaller, lighter and more mobile and integrated armed forces became more pronounced. The British announced “Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter” in July 2002, and a new version of Defence White Paper in December 2003 termed “Delivering Security in a Changing World.” In the new white paper, they clearly stated that “International terrorism and the proliferation of WMD represent the most direct threats to our peace and security.” At the same time they stated that “working with other Government Departments, we need also to consider and address the underlying causes of these threats.” Their version of Network Centric Warfare was termed Network Enabled Capabilities (NEC).¹⁴

The French also revised their reform process in the 2003-2008 military programme. The Germans came out with a new “Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien” (Defence Policy Guidelines) in May 2003 and “Grundzüge der Konzeption der Bundeswehr” (Principles of the Concept of Bundeswehr) in August 2004.

On NATO and EU level, there were also efforts to create mobile rapid reaction forces. NATO announced the creation of NRF (NATO Response Force). US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld put forward a proposal to create a NATO rapid reaction force in September 2002. NRF initiative was announced at the Prague Summit in November 2002. It was approved by Ministers of Defence in June 2003 in Brussels. This was a very difficult time for the transatlantic relations, since many of the Europeans were against the intervention in Iraq started by the Bush administration in March 2003. In order not to become totally irrelevant in the new strategic environment, NATO needed a new initiative and NRF concept was central to this process of “transformation” of NATO. NRF is based on a system of rotation; member countries commit land, air, naval or special forces units to the NRF for a six-month period. It has reached its full operational capability in October 2006. It numbers 25,000 troops and is able to be deployed after five days’ notice and sustain itself for 30 days or longer if

resupplied.

On the other hand, EU tried to bring in originality in their approach to security. This was at the same time an effort to bridge the gap between the member countries created by their differing attitudes towards the Iraq War. The first such result was the European Security Strategy in December 2003. In this document, they declared that “the European Union is inevitably a global player.” They recognized Terrorism, Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime as the main threats. They claimed at the same time that “in contrast to the massive visible threat in the Cold War, none of the new threats is purely military: nor can any be tackled by purely military means.” They require mixture of political, social, economical and military means. The European Union claimed to be “particularly well equipped to respond to such multi-faceted situations.”¹⁵

The EU subsequently set up Headline Goal 2010 at the Brussels European Council on 17 and 18 June 2004. It was decided that “building on the Helsinki Headline and capability goals and recognizing that existing shortfalls still need to be addressed, Member States have decided to commit themselves to the whole spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the Treaty on the European Union.” This included humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. As indicated by the European Security Strategy (ESS) this might also include joint disarmament operations, the support for third countries in combating terrorism and security sector reform.”¹⁶

Amongst others, it proposed the establishment of a civil-military cell within the EUMS, the establishment of European Defence Agency, the complete development by 2007 of rapidly deployable battlegroups. These Battlegroups were supposed to be able to take the decision to launch an operation within 5 days of the approval of the Crisis Management Concept by the Council. The forces should start implementing their mission on the ground no later than 10 days after the EU decision to launch the operation.¹⁷

The question that needs to be addressed is: how useful can NRF and EU Battlegroups be? In what situations are they most likely to be utilized?

The biggest battlegrounds today are places like Iraq, Afghanistan, Congo and Sudan. It is not a classical type of war where states fight against states. They are often called “asymmetric war” or “irregular wars.”¹⁸ In order to fight these kinds of wars, use of military force alone would most likely not suffice. The use of rapid reaction force alone would certainly not suffice. The American forces won a stunning victory against enemy forces both in Afghanistan and Iraq. But they were unable to consolidate a stable political authority following the collapse of the autocratic regimes. They are now much more aware of the importance of what is usually called “peacebuilding” or “nation-building.” These tasks cannot be accomplished by network-centric warfare. When the international community together with indigenous political forces fails to establish stable political authority during the window of opportunity following the

ceasefire, than the country is likely to fall into a long period of instability and may become a failed state. During most of the 20th century, we could still afford to leave a failed state in a far away continent. But in the 21st century globalised world, a failed state or civil war could breed terrorism which may hit back at any of the developed countries. We have all become very vulnerable as a result of globalization of security. That is why we all need to think twice about appropriate ways to counter the security threats.

One example of developing EU capabilities in this direction is proposed by the Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities. It is termed "A Human Security Doctrine for Europe." In the executive summary it is stated:

"Human security refers to freedom for individuals from basic insecurities caused by gross human rights violations. The doctrine comprises three elements:

- A set of seven principles for operations in situations of severe insecurity that apply to both ends and means. These principles are: the primacy of human rights, clear political authority, multilateralism, a bottom-up approach, regional focus, the use of legal instruments, and the appropriate use of force. The report puts particular emphasis on the bottom-up approach: on communication, consultation, dialogue and partnership with the local population in order to improve early warning, intelligence gathering, mobilization of local support, implementation and sustainability.
- A 'Human Security Response Force,' composed of 15,000 men and women, of whom at least one third would be civilian (Police, human rights monitors, development and humanitarian specialists, administrators, etc.) The Force would be drawn from dedicated troops and civilian capabilities already made available by member states as well as a proposed 'Human Security Volunteer Service.'
- A new legal framework to govern both the decision to intervene and operations on the ground. This would build on the domestic law of host states, the domestic law of sending states, international criminal law, international human rights law and international humanitarian law.

The report proposes that the Human Security Response Force would be under the direction of the new Foreign Minister of Europe, appointed under the Constitution agreed in Dublin in June 2004." ¹⁹

The report argues that "the 11 September and 11 March attacks have made it clear once and for all that no citizens of the world are any longer safely ensconced behind their national borders, and sources of insecurity are no longer most likely to come in the form of border incursions by foreign armies."

EU is trying to respond to such security challenges by making ESDP more comprehensive.

Amongst the ongoing ESDP operations, there are more civilian missions than military missions. These civilian missions include the EU police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM); EU Police mission in the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS) Operation Proxima in Macedonia (police mission), and Operation EUJUST-Themis, the rule of law mission in Georgia. And there have been three military missions: Concordia in Macedonia; Artemis in DRC; and EUFOR-DRC this year.²⁰

The EU is acting increasingly independent from NATO. NATO and EU have agreed on the so-called Berlin-Plus agreement to utilize NATO assets for EU operations. This was agreed first in Berlin Council in June 1996, confirmed in the Washington Council in April 1999, and finalized in a package agreement on 17 March 2003. During the course of the Balkan conflict, it was thought that the EU needed many NATO assets which it could not supply by itself, and the agreement also eased the fear on the Washington side that the EU was developing autonomous capabilities. But the two recent military missions in DRC have been conducted outside Berlin Plus agreement, the first using French command system and the second using the German command in Potsdam.

So EU has gradually been developing its own definition of security strategy and accumulating experiences of its own. Although the examples have been very few up till now, we may see more of it in the near future, especially in Africa and the Near East.

Even so, EU will still be a regional organization. Its activities will be limited to the peripheries of larger Europe. So in spite of the declaration in European Security Strategy, Europe will for the foreseeable future remain a regional actor.

What about NATO? Can NATO be a global player? Ivo Daalder and James Goldgeier have pleaded for a "Global NATO" in the recent edition of *Foreign Affairs*.²¹ It is important that close partnership be developed between NATO and democratic countries such as Japan and Australia. But that does not mean cooperation must be achieved through membership. The Central and Eastern Europeans wanted to join NATO and EU to be part of the Europe "whole and free," and because they thought NATO gave them the necessary stability and security guarantee they sought. None of the mentioned countries, apart from Israel, has a need for security guarantee from NATO. They already possess such guarantee through alliance with America. There have been advocates for Israel's membership of NATO, but it is doubtful whether Israel can solve its security problems, even by joining NATO²². On its part, NATO is capable of acting as a strategic coordinator for missions such as ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) in Afghanistan in the present form. So NATO does not need to open its membership to non-European countries in order to become a global actor. But in order to be a successful global player, NATO needs to coordinate its actions with non-military aspects of stabilization. NATO itself will remain predominantly military organization, but it must coordinate its strategies with other non-military organizations.

In conclusion, Europe is on the course of developing autonomous capabilities of projecting stability abroad, but its reach is still limited. For the foreseeable future, NATO seems to remain the organization to bundle together capabilities of different forces from around the world as it already does in Afghanistan. And the world needs to think further than just achieving military victories, since stabilizing a region in the 21st century involves much more than capable and deployable armed forces.

- 1 Joseph S. Nye Jr., *Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History*, 5th Edition, (New York: Pearson, Longman, 2005), pp.192-3.
- 2 Declaration on a transformed North Atlantic Alliance issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council ('The London Declaration') London 6 July 1990.
- 3 The Alliance's Strategic Concept agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Rome 11 November 1991.
- 4 Franco-British summit, Joint declaration on European defense, Saint-Malo, 4 December 1998
- 5 Petersberg Declaration, Western European Union, Council of Ministers, Bonn 19th June 1992.
- 6 David C. Gompert and F. Stephen Larrabee; *America and Europe: A Partnership for a New Era*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997)
- 7 Presidency Conclusions, Cologne European Council, 3 and 4 June 1999. CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy) was established as one of the three pillar of the Maastricht Treaty, signed on 7 February 1992 and entered into force on 1 November 93.
- 8 Annex III, European Council Declaration on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence, Cologne European Council, 3 and 4 June 1999.
- 9 Helsinki European Council, 10 and 11 November 1999, Presidency Conclusions, II. Common European Policy on Security and Defence.
- 10 The Alliance's Strategic Concept, Approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C., on 23rd and 24th April 1999, (24) and (53)i.
- 11 Yoko Iwama. "The New Shape of the U.S. Alliance System," *Gaiko Forum*, Spring 2004, pp.20-29.
- 12 Nye, op.cit., p.194.
- 13 There were two reports released in May 2000, one was "Gemeinsame Sicherheit und Zukunft der Bundeswehr," by the Weizsäcker Kommission and the other was "Eckwerte für die konzeptionelle und planerische weiterentwicklung der Streitkräfte," by Generalinspekteur der Bundeswehr.
- 14 "Delivering Security in a Changing World," 2.3.
- 15 "A Secure Europe in a better World: European Security Strategy," (12 December 2003), <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>
- 16 Headline Goal 2010, <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/2010%20Headline%20Goal.pdf>
- 17 The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (signed by the Heads of State or Government of the 25 Member States and the 3 candidate countries On 29 October 2004) adopted also an expanded expression about its security tasks in III-210.1 : " The tasks referred to in Article I-40(1) in the course of which the Union may use civilian and military means, shall include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking and post-conflict stabilization. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories."
- 18 Rupert Smith in *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World* (Allen Lane, 2005) calls these types of conflict "war amongst the people"; Mary Kaldor in *New & Old Wars* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006) 2nd edition, calls them "new wars."

- 19 "A Human Security Doctrine for Europe," the Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities., Barcelona, 15 September 2004. <http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/Publications/HumanSecurityDoctrine.pdf> See also Mary Kaldor and Andrew Salmon, "Military Force and European Strategy," *Survival* vol.48, No.1, Spring 2006, pp.19-34; Marlies Glasius and Mary Kaldor (ed.), *A Human Security Doctrine for Europe: Project, principles, practicalities*, (London: Routledge, 2006).
- 20 Complete list of operations can be found at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.asp?id=268&lang=en>.
- 21 Ivo Daalder and James Goldgeier, "Global NATO," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 85, No.5, September/October 2006, pp.105-113.
- 22 Ronald Asmus and Bruce Jackson, "Does Israel Belong in the EU and NATO: Its place in the Euro-Atlantic community," *Policy Review* No. 129, February & March 2005.