

Problems and Prospects of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP): A German View*.

Reimund Seidelmann

“Peace is not a donation. In the world, in which we live, the will for peace is not enough. Our children can only enter a better world, if we are ready and able to preserve peace.” (Willy Brandt, 1970)

“The superpowers dominate world politics. I, Francois Mitterand, say: this is not right.” (Text of an election campaign poster of the campaign of Francois Mitterand for President of France in the early 80’s)

1. The general background

The European Union’s political project from the Maastricht Summit to establish a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the idea from its Amsterdam and the following Summits to merge the Western European Union (WEU) and its parliamentary assembly into the EU-system as well as to establish a Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP), and the Helsinki Summit decision to build up a EU military intervention capacity of 60,000 men must be viewed both against the specific security as well as the general political background.

1.1. This historical background

The historical dimension of the security background goes back to the late 70’s, when the European Parliament started to deal with security issues¹ to contribute to a political agenda dominated by the debate about NATO’s double track decision, the emergence of European peace movements, and the first Reagan administration’s strategy to re-polarize the East-West conflict and to re-establish leadership against the European allies. Followed by the revitalization of the WEU and the idea of Maastricht’s Political Union to complement the economic power of the EU with a CFSP, the conceptualization of a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) led consequently to the decision to establish an independent military component. Confronted with a competitive NATO, which proved to be unwilling to allow adequate Europeanization², the failure of the doctrine of “interlocking institutions”³, and a policy of NATO enlargement, which seemed to be less and less complementary to EU enlargement,⁴ it was finally triggered by the Yugoslavian conflicts, which

underlined both the deficits and failures of Maastricht's CFSP-project as well as the necessity to establish a European military intervention capacity both as a political instrument to reduce U.S. military leverage as well as to increase EU's capacity to prevent, control, and manage militarised conflicts of the type, size, and intensity of the Yugoslavian conflict⁵. In sum, CESDP in general, like the creation of the EU's intervention force, is not a "single event out of the blue" but results from three interrelated historical developments: an overall political trend in Europe to complement economic with military power, dissatisfaction with political-institutional relations within the Transatlantic Alliance after the end of the East-West conflict translated into the political will to reduce dependency on NATO or U.S. dominance, and the political failure both of the EU in general as well as its CFSP in particular to adequately prevent, control, and solve the developments in Yugoslavia⁶.

1.2. The institutional background and the military problems

The organisational or institutional dimension of the security background reaffirms the thesis that ESDP and the intervention force is not a unique or single event but a component of a still-amorphous but emerging overall setting. This consists of ESDP and its mechanisms attached to the European Council as the political-institutional element, the integration of WEU's military planning and related capacities as the military staff element, the establishment of the intervention force based on experiences made, for example, with the EuroCorps⁷, recent decisions to develop an independent European satellite and air transport capacity⁸, and finally the project of creating a Common European Armament Market and supporting the Europeanization of European defence industries⁹ as the defence-economic element. Although this setting shows a number of inconsistencies, contradictions, and dilemmas it could be easily turned into a cohesive, effective, and militarily attractive grand concept if a sustainable political will could be developed.

However, to understand both the development as well as the perspective of this institutional-organisational setting one has to refer to fundamental trends in military cost-effectiveness rationality. Military cost-effectiveness in today's EU — as well as greater Europe — is shaped by four structural developments. First, costs for R&D, production, and maintenance of modern armaments are further escalating. Second, traditional ways of cost-cutting or reductions¹⁰ prove to be less and less effective. Third, the transformation of armed forces based to a significant degree on draftees into a professional army based on volunteers leads towards a significant increase in personnel costs. And fourth — and mainly as a result of the end of the East-West military confrontation — political elites as well as the public not only question continued high defence budgets but have significantly reduced absolute and relative defence spending.

Further, reducing defence spending from about 3.5% of GNP of NATO-Europe in the years 1980–84 to 2.1% in the year 2000¹¹, continuing with duplication and non-standardization of military capacities in NATO-Europe and in particular with EU-

Europe after the next round of enlargement, maintaining national armament industries, and allowing the gap between effective U.S. and EU military R&D to further widen, means that European military capacities not only further decrease in relative and absolute effectiveness but show a significantly lower “productivity” than comparable U.S. capacities¹². “Europeanizing” plus “peace-intervention-orientation” promise a solution to these trends: it allows the improvement of the cost-effectiveness of defence spending through synergetic effects¹³, limits such a capacity to selective military roles, creates a European armament industry able to compete or to cooperate on equal terms with that of the U.S., increases public acceptance of the “new” peacekeeping military, and finally legitimises increases in defence budgets.

1.3. The general political background

In addition to these historical, institutional, and military developments projects like the CESDP and the EU’s intervention force have to be understood as resulting from general political developments as well. Here, three major developments have to be underlined: interrelating security with peace policies, establishing the EU as an effective and credible global player, and promoting EU integration.

Searching for peace as an essential idealistic guideline¹⁴, incentive, and legitimisation for general and specific foreign policies constituted an important tradition in European political philosophy from early Christianity through enlightenment to modern theories of the civic society. Interrelating such an idealistic approach with realism-oriented security policies has been a major challenge for redefining the Western European political system, better governance of the East-West conflict through détente, and reorganising the pan-European order after the end of the East-West conflict. It has to be remembered that Western European integration was designed from the very beginning as the establishment of a peace-in-security-community facing inside, eliminating both the security dilemma through integration — and therefore solving the German problem — as well as establishing cooperative structures based on common security, growth, and democratic values within Western Europe. Détente, which Europeans still regard as an essential factor not only in de-militarizing but as well in solving the East-West conflict¹⁵, introduced a double formula: security redefined through associative peace strategies and common security plus less dependency from the bloc-leaders through a peace-in-security strategy between Eastern and Western Europe. Extending the EU towards the East through enlargement, association, and special relations, which aims at the formula that Europe is the EU and the EU pursues European interests, is not only a matter of power strategy but also of projecting Western European norms and models towards the East and eventually other neighbouring regions together with the widening of the democratic growth and peace community. Although this interrelation between peace and security has not been made explicit in present EU discussions about the CFSP and CESDP, it nevertheless is a basic ingredient, legitimising these new efforts and turning them from a now-pragmatic muddling-through into a consistent policy of

better global governance with the effective participation of the EU. It will be only a matter of time until this idea is operationalised either in the EU's foreign policy identity and/or in its future Charter. While distancing the future EU as a global player with political, economic, and military powers from traditional superpowers' either benevolent or unfriendly interventionism, the new militarily able EU would identify itself as a global peace policing force, which aims not only for better global governance but for a more civic definition of foreign policy and international relations.

As already mentioned, Europe's peace approach revitalised in détente policies was not only an idealistic but a realistic approach as well. It aimed not only to overcome Europe's East-West division but as well to **reduce dependencies** on superpower security guarantees to widen freedom of action, allow a more independent domestic and foreign course, and rediscover Europe's political identity as a region on its own. CFSP and the following projects meant in terms of transatlantic relations the repetition of the economic pattern — i.e. to develop from a dependent actor towards an equal partner. This idea of complementing constructive — and necessarily sometimes competitive — partnership in the economic field through gradual — i.e. more acceptable — development of a better responsibility in the military-security field was not designed as decoupling but as redefining the political pattern of transatlantic relations in terms of a more balanced power formula. Although CFSP, CESDP, and the EU intervention force cannot and will not replace NATO's military function for the coming years, it carries at least four political objectives all aiming at reducing dependency on U.S. military services:

- First, an independent intervention force — even of the limited size and reach of the present EU intervention force — could be used to trigger or force an unwilling NATO and/or U.S. into peace-operations¹⁶.
- Second, such a military capability plus adequate infrastructure, weaponry, and transregional projection options would constitute a politically important message of better burden sharing within the Transatlantic Alliance.
- Third, such a force always implies the option to increase both its quality and quantity to eventually substitute NATO's role in the long run, which could be used to ensure NATO's cooperation with the EU even in cases of diverging interests.
- Fourth, such a force could eventually be the first step into a new concept of a global division of labour between the U.S. and Europe in terms of peace-keeping, general security services, and military interventions.

It has to be underlined — and in particular to the U.S. and other global players — that the political concept of becoming “a better partner” to the U.S. not only means a more independent Europe — in economic, military, and political terms — but as well a call for the political reorganisation — not the dissolution! — of the Atlantic

Alliance. Although less effective but similar in function to the creation of the European Monetary Union (EMU) in the economic field, the build-up of an EU intervention force aims for a stronger, more independent, but basically cooperative EU. Reducing dependency, establishing a more balanced equality in power dimensions, and building an independent military intervention capability is part of the EU's development into a stronger and more globally oriented international power. In other words, the EU's political ambitions in security policies follow not only a negative rationality — i.e. reducing dependency on the U.S. and U.S. leadership through NATO — but are one of the necessary conditions to establish the EU as a comprehensive global actor. The EU's gradual and still-selective globalisation — from the Lomé Treaties over the EU's engagement in Latin America to the EU's widening and deepening cooperation with the Asian-Pacific region — would be ineffective, if the EU continued to limit itself to being an only-economic actor. Globalizing the EU's reach, influence, and control both towards non-European regions and countries as well as within the U.N. system needs the complementing of economic with effective military means as well as the ability and willingness to make use of them both, within as well as outside of Europe.

1.4. The integrative function

As with the creation of the European Monetary Union, such a demand for effectiveness in terms of political will and military capacity means to understand CFSP, CESDP, the intervention force, and related initiatives not only in terms of peace and globalization policies but as a major integration project as well. As in the case of the EMU, extra-European and intra-European functions are tied together — in general as well in particular vis-à-vis the limited present quantity and quality of the EU's intervention force. Thus, the demand for military effectiveness, better cost-benefit rationality, and a stronger position towards NATO and the U.S. translates into a policy of overcoming intra-European divisions and duplications through integration. CFSP, CESDP, and the intervention force constitute the most important — and politically ambitious — integration project after the EMU. Evaluating their integrative functions can therefore be based on a comparison with the EMU; this helps to understand the problems and perspectives of CFSP, CESDP, and the intervention force better. This can be done in three steps.

First, similar to the EMU, the CSFP project and its follow-ups

were introduced by the Maastricht Treaties¹⁷ as part of the package deal between united Germany and the EC to reaffirm Germany's engagement in integration and to revitalize the integration process, seemed necessary to improve the new EU's global role and position as well as helpful to promote integration, and aimed to solve structural problems in the respective issue areas, i.e. the monetary

and security/defence/military policies mentioned above.

Second, the basic differences between the EMU and the CFSP/CESDP/intervention force lay in their operationalisation:

While the EMU followed an uncompromising integration approach in transferring all national monetary sovereignty to the EU, the CFSP/CESDP/intervention force preferred the intergovernmental approach as the smallest common denominator of EU member states.

While the EMU for both political as well as monetary reasons constitutes a union of the willing and able, which conditions membership, CFSP/CESDP follow the broad and comprehensive understanding of integration as a process of all, with all, and for all, while the intervention force opens all possible options for non- to full-participation.

While the EMU established a political willing and in monetary affairs able institutional framework — i.e. the European Central Bank — including necessary powers and competences, CSFP/CESDP/intervention force were attached to the European Council, became hostage to EU member states' willingness to overcome its far-reaching differences in security, defence, and peace-keeping interests, and restrained the Council's High Representative from responding effectively to security and peace crises.

While the EMU united national monetary powers into an integrated monetary "superpower" of equal size to the U.S. monetary capacity, CFSP/CESDP/intervention force constitute both towards the military capacity of EU member states as well as towards NATO — at present — only a supplementary if not "footnote" power capacity, which is highly restricted in quality, quantity, options, finances, and general political support.

While the EMU fully fulfilled its role as an important integration project and documented EU member states' political willingness to transform the EU into a stronger and more integrated global actor, the CFSP/CESDP/intervention force will constitute for the foreseeable future a major issue for continued conflicts, set-backs, and potential failures or — in sum — more of a burden than an engine for integration.

Third, an explanation of why the projects produced such different outcomes although they were invented as a consistent package in Maastricht can underline the following aspects:

Although most EU member states have long experience in military (NATO) integration a number of them — and in particular Great Britain — were not willing to opt for full transfer of security or foreign policy sovereignties to the EU resulting both from a general attitude towards continued integration

and particular sensitivities towards military integration in an EU framework.

While the pre-EMU monetary power constellation was characterized by an unchallengable German hegemony, which the other EU memberstates wanted to overcome, the military power constellation has and still is characterized by both a tripolarity (Great Britain, France, Germany) in conventional weaponry and a “duopolarity” (Great Britain, France) in nuclear armaments. Such a structure did not create in general the unifying drive to control the only hegemon through integration but more a stagnated balance-of-power situation between the leading military powers as well as between the leading military powers, the smaller ones, and the former neutral and non-aligned countries. And in particular this did not allow Germany to play the role of the architect as well as the force responsible for progress and solidity.

While there was no politically attractive alternative to the EMU, CFSP/CESDP/intervention force had to compete with a politically and militarily well-positioned, proven, and effective NATO, which not only guarantees continued U.S. services for European security but constitutes a politically and budgetarily attractive alternative.

Although both resulted from Maastricht’s invention of the EU as a capable Political Union, an influential global actor, based on a strong and sustained integration dynamic, the EMU proved to be a success of will and the ability to integrate while CFSP/CESDP/intervention force not only illustrated a lack of will and ability but developed into a burden for the EU’s integration agenda. The EU’s dilemma, however, is that exactly these limitations allowed the establishment of both the institutional mechanism and the military capacity despite reluctant member states and eased the anxieties of NATO and the U.S. over losing control of European security and suffering further declines in global leadership.

1.5. The German view

Looking at the development, operationalization, and implementation of a European security identity from a German view one must realize Germany’s specific historical experiences, interests, and role as a major and central European player¹⁸. In all three aspects Germany differs from countries such as Great Britain and this explains some of the difficulties in reaching agreement either on the general idea of the future of Europe and/or specific projects such as the EMU and the CFSP/CESDP/intervention force¹⁹.

In historical terms, Germany has had three major and important experiences. First, Germany’s rise from a de-facto-occupied country without real sovereignty to a leading power within the pan-European region resulted to a high degree from its strategy of combining integration, partnership-oriented good-neighbourhood poli-

cies, and military restraint. Second, Germany's *détente* policies successfully linked peace and security, reduced military costs and risks, and opened the way for later reunification. Third, sacrificing politically sensitive monetary sovereignty and hegemony for the EMU proved to be an opportunity not only to reaffirm Germany's engagement with integration but also to project German monetary principles and models to an integrated EMU. In sum, European integration proved to be important for Germany in overcoming marginalisation and developing into a major leading force in Europe.

This historically pro-integration oriented German attitude to the EU and pan-Europe is equally supported by a particularly attractive cost-benefit-ratio for German interests in Europe. Despite relatively high direct and indirect German financial-budgetary contributions to European integration the economic advantages of integration — and continued and enlarged integration — are far larger than related costs. In addition, Germany's growing global economic engagement asks for a political complement such as CFSP. For Germany as a geopolitical as well as structural European "central" player the political advantages of integration, enlargement, and establishing an integrative peace-force are obvious; they secure, increase, and widen Germany's centrality in the EU as well as in greater Europe. In military terms Germany has been used to far-reaching integration, cooperation, and the idea that only common defence is credible and effective; in addition the German arms industry defines the CESDP/intervention force/Common European Armament Market as a major and extremely attractive opportunity.

In terms of influence, power, and global power projection CFSP/CESDP/intervention force are equally attractive. As a newcomer in peace-keeping missions and with no record in out-of-area military interventions Germany understands CESDP and the intervention force as an attractive and cost-effective additional means for its power projection. But the EU's intervention force is in the German view not only cost-effective — i.e. it provides interesting new power opportunities through participation in integrative structures at acceptable costs — but also provides a domestic and international acceptance and legitimacy no German national intervention force could or would ever acquire. Re-unified Germany's desire to play a greater role both in the greater European region as well as globally looks at the CESDP/intervention force as the politically and militarily most adequate way to underline its cooperative and integrative approach as well as to improve, widen, and deepen its influence and power status.

In sum, Germany's historical experience, its political, military, and economic interests, and its power strategies all support not only a cooperative but an integrative approach in foreign and security policies in general and in the CESDP/intervention force in particular. Therefore, Germany will continue to support this project with special preference for integrative solutions and for projecting German peace-and-security concepts into CFSP/CESDP just as it did with "Germanizing" the EMU project.

2. CESDP and EU's intervention force: objectives and problems

Both the Helsinki and the Nice Summit provided member states, the EU (Commission, Council, Parliament), and the outside with clear political-military objectives for the build-up and the use of the intervention force. The most important are a troop-strength of 60,000²⁰, operationability for peace missions after 2003, and independence from but cooperation with NATO. In comparison to Summits like Amsterdam these Headline Goals constitute a major step forward. But as mentioned above, the present political, institutional, military, and budgetary approaches do not solve the CFSP/CESDP/intervention force's structural limitations and dilemmas but project them into the implementation of the Headline Goals in the coming years. Following a pragmatic approach, i.e. to solve problems gradually, selectively and in exploiting constellational or situational windows of opportunities, instead of the "big bang" approach as taken in the case of the EMU, where concept and operationalization were agreed upon before implementation, means that the future of the CFSP/CESDP/intervention force is and remains unclear — it depends on EU member states' political willingness as well as military-budgetary ability.

2.1. Political-institutional problems

One can start the evaluation of the gap between political intentions and reality with analysing the political-will-building in general and political unity, institutional setting, and political support for a Europeanistic approach in particular. Concerning unity or general consensus it was outlined above that the EU's intervention force is at the moment less an integrative and more a joint-venture project of EU's member states in the framework of the European Council in the tradition of European Political Cooperation (EPC), but with an upgraded and improved decision-making process²¹. Thus the present situation as well as perspectives are primarily the result of member states' political willingness. In this regard one can distinguish between the following types of nation states and candidates for

- the traditional pro-integration-oriented and "willing" actors such as the "old European six" (Benelux, F,G²², I),
- the pro-intergovernmentalistic "willing" actors such as the UK,
- the non-interested actors such as the Scandinavian and other former neutral and non-aligned countries — some of them tolerating such initiatives and some of them with reservations towards such projects,
- the "Trojan-horse" actors, i.e. actors not interested in an independent EU military dimension, and directly and/or indirectly blocking, delaying, or obstructing such projects.²³

Although even present EU policies on CESDP and the intervention force constitute politically a considerable step ahead, these diversities create far-reaching prob-

lems for the **consensus-building process concerning the use of the intervention force within the Council**. Restraining the role of the Council's High Representative to a sort of agent for only implementing and not pre-empting Council decisions²⁴, means to make the fundamental decisions, when, where, how long, and how to use the intervention force, a hostage of situational opportunity, cycles of domestic acceptance, political blackmail, etc. — i.e. to the traditional patterns of decision-making in the Council. Such dynamics of political-will-building contrast sharply with the necessity to act quickly, in a determined, and united way in cases of a militarised or militarising crisis. They contrast as well with NATO's decision-making process, where such problems can easily be solved or put aside through U.S. leadership²⁵. As long as the Council's decision-making continues with such patterns²⁶, the malevolent crisis-actor may, can, and will count on political division within the Council, slow and ambivalent decision-making, and eventually early abortion of missions²⁷. Instead of deterring malevolence, such structures — given the traditional patterns and dynamics of the Council — are opening windows of opportunity. As long as the highest political level — i.e. the ministers in the Council — implies such problems for will-building, the recently established political machinery on the second level of the decision-making process, i.e. the High Representative, the Committees (PSC, EUMC), and its staff (EUMS) cannot produce effectiveness despite its consistent and convincing organisation.

But even under the assumption that political consensus has been reached, **the institutional-organisational setting** creates structural problems for effectiveness, cost-benefit rationality, or wise-governance-policy. This results from the fact that due to the intergovernmental approach the CFSP/CESDP/intervention force is attached to the Council and not — following an integrationistic approach — subordinated to the European Commission. There is no doubt that this has advantages; setting up a new institutional structure within the Council allows the organizer to create optimal conditions, to avoid administrative legacies, and to realize efficiency. Placing it under the umbrella of the Commission would have meant confronting the well-known limitations, problems, and inner contradictions of the Commission's decision-making process. But this approach of installing parallel institutions — i.e. placing the economic dimension of foreign and security policies including peace-interventions at the Commission, and the military dimensions at the Council — creates on the one side competitive institutions and contradictions between economic and military measures, and prevents on the other side the formation of an effective, cohesive, and consistent grand strategy, which effectively combines sanctions with incentives, economic with military means, and negative security- with positive peace-building. This is not a problem of competing personalities as it has often been presented to the public²⁸, but a problem of institutional structures plus a lack of clear political subordination²⁹.

But even in the case where political consensus between member states and between Commission and Council would exist, a third problem arises, if **independence of EU intervention capacities and missions** are sought. Vis-à-vis the declaration

that the goal to establish an intervention force has been met politically³⁰ this “independent” intervention force depends completely on NATO’s staff³¹ and military support. Concerning three essential conditions for power projection beyond EU borders — i.e. logistics, air transport, and C³ + I — the EU force cannot act without or independent from NATO. And this situation would last for the next 5–10 years under the condition that the sustainable political will and financial resources existed to acquire such means independently from or parallel to NATO³²; if not it would last indefinitely. This translates into the fact that in cases of conflict or different political approaches to crises between the U.S./NATO and the EU, the EU intervention force cannot and will not be able to act. Military dependency of this quality and for this period of time prevents political autonomy or missions independent from NATO. Thus, “independence” is not only a question of political will — i.e. whether and to what degree the Council is able and willing to pursue policies different from or even conflicting with those of the U.S. — but also of the present military realities. And these — at least for the coming years — simply do not allow independent EU missions if NATO and/or the U.S. disagree.

2.2. Military problems

Following the intergovernmental political approach towards CFSP and CESDP, looking for minimal consensus between all member states, and avoiding open confrontation with either NATO or the U.S., the EU opted not for a military force integrated as in NATO but for a multilateral stand-by force in the tradition of WEU, EuroCorps, etc., but based on the participation of all EU members. Sacrificing military integration in order to win political consensus created not only the well-known problems in commanding multilateral forces but also the forging of all advantages of synergy through integration. Delays and silent opposition against the creation of an effective Common European Armament Market as a necessary complement of a credible and independent EU force have further limited the perspectives for optimal effectiveness.

But besides this general deficit of this multilateral approach, three specific problems of a military nature, which significantly undermine the original Headline Goals, have appeared: the already discussed dependency on U.S./NATO support concerning logistics, air transport, and C³ + I, the realisation of troop strengths, and the emerging difference between multilateralism and integrationism.

When EU and member states understood that a targeted in-the-field-strength of 60,000 meant to establish a stand-by-force of about 200,000, some member states evaded the necessary extra-build-up through double assignment or promised to provide while knowing that this would not be materialized³³. Such a limited or even symbolic engagement seems to narrow the original approach to involve all towards the already practiced approach of the willing — and in particular the Big Three (Great Britain, France, Germany). In sum, the present reality of the intervention force follows the model of the coalition-of-the willing without providing its political-

military advantages.

Responding to the lack of adequate — and politically necessary — logistics, air transport capabilities, and an effective C³ + I-Infrastructure, some of the willing member states — the newly established European Air Group (Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Netherlands, Spain³⁴) — introduced the idea to create specific integrated services³⁵ instead of repeating the mistakes of multilateral combat forces of the past. For the moment this idea is limited to air transport but could easily be extended to the other two deficits as well. Integrated services, which avoid duplication from the very beginning, would have two advantages: first a significantly better cost-effectiveness, which would be important vis-à-vis the to-be-expected costs, and second to introduce an integrated model “through the backdoor”, which then could be extended to other areas as well. However, even the constructive coexistence of a multilateral and an integrated model would carry both military and in particular political costs if it came to opting-out policies, which could be pursued in the Council by generally or tactically unwilling member states. Unlike NATO, which has established a successful model of management for a common infrastructure with integrated military forces³⁶, this would create additional strain for the political as well as the military decision-making process.

But given the experiences in NATO, given the to-be-expected success-orientation of the involved military, and given the constructive and probably cooperative competition between the EU’s intervention force and NATO’s military organisation, in principle these military problems seem solvable either through pragmatic compromise or through learning-because-of-mission-failure. The real problems for the military build-up, maintainance, and field-mission lie less in the military organisation than in the needed financial or budgetary resources.

2.3. Budgetary problems

Before evaluating the depth and width of the budgetary problems, one has first to calculate the estimated costs of an effective intervention force. Under the condition that in general the Headline Goals have to be realised and in particular the dependency on NATO’s support in the areas of logistic, air transport, and C³ + I has to be overcome, a realistic estimate can foresee additional total investment costs of 200–300 billions € (at today’s prices) in a build-up period between 5–10 years (minimum). This would mean to raise defence spending in NATO-Europe from around 2% to 2.3–2.8% of GNP³⁷.

Second, these costs must be related to general government spending, to past defence expenditures, and to its effects on the EU’s armament economy. Related to other public projects of EU member states this amount looks more impressive than it is de facto. If the political will existed these expenses could be made even in the present economic slow-down. Compared to the past, where defence expenditures between 3–5% of GNP were regarded as normal, acceptable, and necessary, a rise in relative defence spending to figures below 3% seem to create no major objective

problems in public spending — in particular if one takes into account that in contrast to the past most of these expenditures would be spent on the EU market³⁸.

But it is not the objective amount of such costs but its political perception which leads to the problem. Third, if one relates such demands for additional defence spending to the present political situation, even such a limited amount seems politically unacceptable both for national parliaments as well as the public. Here, the following should be taken into account:

1. After the end of the East-West conflict there are problems in legitimising such expenses through a credible and apparent military threat. Hopes for a major peace-dividend have further reduced willingness to tolerate or even accept such increases.
2. Present restructuring, necessary re-investment, and demands from NATO to modernize and improve existing military capacities are intra-budgetary competitors towards such additional expenses.
3. A major political campaign to create support for such expenditures might be countered by the argument that this could be done better and cheaper through the well-established NATO. This would de-legitimize not only additional spending but the Europeanistic approach underlying the CFSP/CESDP/intervention force in general.
4. An expected underfinancing of the EU's intervention force will limit not only its effectiveness in missions but might — together with other factors — lead to mission failure, which then would not only de-legitimize EU's intervention force but military peace-keeping missions in general.

For supporters of an integrated, EU-commanded, and adequately financed model, three additional points should be considered:

1. Compared to the present EU budget (2001) of 93 billions € an additional spending for common defence between 15 and 54 billions € per year would be a major qualitative and quantitative change in the size and the structure of the budget.
2. To raise the money needed for such an intervention force would confront the EU's budget with major political challenges such as fund raising, control, and spending.
3. Following the experience of NATO this would lead to a continued and intense dispute on burden sharing, which would further strain the EU's internal consensus-building.
4. Vis-à-vis the present problems of good administration within the European Commission both the establishment as well as the control of a Europeanizing armament industry constitutes a major challenge to improving the Commission's administrative performance and an additional danger of

de-legitimizing the EU because of inevitable scandals in arms procurement etc.

If one regards the military problems mentioned above as relatively easy to solve, the political dynamic of the budgetary problems produces such an inflationary pressure on the political will-building of the main actors — i.e. the nation states — that declaratory, symbolic, and postponing politics will become an increasingly attractive answer. In a situation of an already overburdened reform agenda both the EU and member states might prefer the political approach already used in Amsterdam — i.e. neither to support nor kill the project but simply to postpone it indefinitely. Given such an evaluation it would be logical for NATO to combine “re-colonisation” — efforts, i.e. to transform the EU intervention force from a semi-independent and politically relevant instrument of an integrating ESDP into a militarily irrelevant appendix to NATO, or to use potential political and/or military failures of the EU intervention force to question its role in general and to re-establish NATO’s political priority and military monopoly in all intra- and extra-European security issues.

3. Perspectives and options

The reaction of EU member states towards military-political support of the U.S. in its military activities in Afghanistan illustrates on the one side the strength of national thinking and acting in EU member states’ foreign and security policy and the EU’s inability to exploit such an opportunity to promote CFSP, CESDP, and the intervention force. But it highlights on the other side the fundamental gap between such national behaviour and the historical, political-institutional, military, and budgetary necessities. This gap between objective necessities and today’s policies is further growing; an economically stronger, enlarging, and politically improving EU, which continues the globalization of its interests and power strategies, demands either an effectively integrated foreign and military behaviour or is confronted with far-reaching restraints, disadvantages, and dependencies from the U.S. As was already pointed out above an additional problem is created by an overburdened political agenda vis-à-vis political constellations between the member states and between EU and member states, which limit the reform process to its present slow pace, indecisive and short-term initiatives, and zero-sum-bargaining.

In principle, **three options** for future developments can be presented. The first option is the continuation of the status quo, i.e. a politically intergovernmental structure, a military multilateral force, and a marginal mission effectiveness, which is compensated for by reference to NATO services. With attractively minimal short-term political, military, and budgetary costs, this option, however, produces not only increasing cumulative costs in the long term but carries significant limitations and risks for securing the EU’s global interests, improving its international role, and

credibility as a democratic peace-community. The second option is based on the assumption that the EU — basically because of a lack of sustained political will — loses its cooperative competition with NATO, which means that NATO re-establishes its monopoly for security, defence, and military services either through adaptation towards the EU's special needs, absorbing the EU's intervention force, or securing the intervention force's dependency on NATO support and assistance. The third option is the gradual political, military, and institutional transformation of the intergovernmental towards an integrative structure — i.e. the European Commission —, the set-up of an integrated force and a common armament market, and the redefinition of the Atlantic Alliance as a true and equal partnership in economic, political, and military affairs, in which the EU takes up more military responsibilities than in the past. To make such an option politically more feasible one could think of a silent transformation of CFSP/CESDP/intervention force from the all-integrative to a union-of-the-willing model such as the EMU, which would reflect already existing structures and would allow accelerated and intensified integration without excluding the legitimate security interests of the unwilling or hesitant.

In the present situation, any forecasting about the future development of the CFSP/CESDP/intervention force in general and its integration potential in particular is difficult vis-à-vis the multitude of divergent trends of conflicting quality and weight. A basically pro-integrationistic view, as prevails in Germany, however, can point both to the recent example of the EMU as a project, which seemed unthinkable ten years ago and today is regarded as an important integration step, as well as to the history of European integration. Not only the case of the EMU but the developments of the last fifty years have proved functionalists, institutionalists, and nation state orientation as wrong. It has shown cycles of stagnation and reform, slow and accelerated progress, and set-backs. But behind such an up-and-down, stop-and-go, and two-steps-ahead-one-step-back dynamic this integration process proved not only irreversible but highly attractive both to the inside as well as the outside. Thus, both the integration of foreign, security, defense, military, and armament policies is not a matter of principle but only a matter of time. This means in other words that the above-mentioned structural problems of the present national plus NATO-oriented security and defence policies as well as foreseeable political-military failures of CESDP and the EU's intervention force will stimulate a learning process of national political elites and the national public, which then will lead to more integration-oriented policies.

Notes

* The reader has to be reminded that this article presents the personal view of the author.

1 See, for example, Reimund Seidelmann, *European Security and the European Communities*. In: *Journal of European Intergration* Vol. VII (1984), pp. 221–251.

2 For example in fully re-attracting France, upgrading Euro-Group, and restructuring into a Two-Pillar-Alliance.

3 This doctrine was often nicknamed “interblocking institutions”.

4 See, for example, Reimund Seidelmann, NATO’s Enlargement as a Policy of Lost Opportunities. In: *Journal of European Integration* No 2–3/1997, Special Issue on Problems of Eastern Europe, pp. 233–245 as well as in: *Cicero Paper Paris/Maastricht* No 3/1997, pp. 41–55.

5 The Yugoslavian conflict can be regarded as three conflicts (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia) resulting from similar causes but handled by the “West”, i.e. the U.S. and the EU, in a different way.

6 In sum, both the Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Kosovo conflicts were regarded as a political failure of the EU in terms of political willingness to implement the spirit and letter of Maastricht’s CFSP project, of political ability to play the dominant role in European conflict management, and of military ability to solve even such a limited conflict like Kosovo.

7 It is not by chance, that France and Germany play a major — if not dominant role — in the intervention force. It is understandable that British policies, which traditionally limited WEU’s military revitalization, excluded British troops from EuroCorps, promoted NATO’s CJTF as an alternative to any Europeanization of military capacities, and finally promoted the Saint-Malo-agreement to counterbalance French-German cooperation, have different views on that.

8 Based on a military version in the Airbus family.

9 Again, it is not by chance that on the one hand France supports privatization of French state defence industries to improve conditions for European mergers and close cooperation and that on the other hand British defence industries seeks active participation and cooperation with U.S. armament industries — for example in the case of the new U.S. fighter aircraft project.

10 Such as the production of large numbers and/or through arms export.

11 Based on statistics provided by NATO, see, for example, NATO Letter No 1/2001.

12 In general, one could say that NATO-Europe gets only 1/3 out of its defence spending compared to the U.S.

13 Overall synergetic effects — i.e. consequent standardization, overcoming duplication, and effective military division of labour — could amount to up to 30%.

14 This can be summarized in the formula: peace is not everything but without peace everything is nothing.

15 For details see Eric Remacle/Reimund Seidelmann (Eds.), *Pan-European security redefined*, Nomos Verlag, Baden-Baden 1998.

16 Trigger strategies were well known in European security policies during the East-West conflict; for example in the French force de frappe as well as the German strategy to place U.S. troops in Germany at the potential frontline and West-Berlin.

17 For details see Panos Tsakaloyannis, *The European Union as a Security Community*, Nomos Verlag, Baden-Baden 1996.

18 Germany plays a leading role in all politically relevant European organisations and institutions such as the EU, NATO, and the OSCE. Its special relations to the U.S., France, and Russia plus its close cooperative links and influence on its neighbouring countries and beyond complement such supra-/multilateral through bilateral leverage and common-interest-building.

19 It has to be remembered that Germany supported actively the integration of foreign and security policies already in Maastricht as well as later.

20 60,000 men means de facto to have a 200,000 men capacity to allow adequate replacement after 4–6 months and have a guaranteed effective troop strength of 60,000.

21 Views referring to shortcomings in the European Council’s staff and its organisation must accept the argument that such shortcomings are of a transitory nature; they result from problems, which can be found in all build-up-processes of professional political staffs and an effective political administrations in the area of foreign and security policy.

22 In the case of Germany it has to be noted that the German foreign minister unilaterally accepted and supported Croatian independence although this would have been clearly an issue for the CFSP-

part of the Treaty of Maastricht, which had only recently been signed.

23 NATO-member Turkey has tried to block NATO's support for the EU's intervention force in order to gain advantages for its aspirations to become a member of the EU. However, this tactic might be abandoned in the coming future both due to political initiatives towards Turkey to change its view as well as to the political learning processes within Turkey's political elites.

24 Due to his specific background and professionalism the present High Representative Solana has successfully introduced an interpretation of this role, which goes much more into a stimulating and sometimes pre-empting responsibility than formally laid down. However, from an institutional viewpoint it is problematic to rely predominantly on the special quality of persons instead of providing clear roles, competences, and legitimacy to the position as well.

25 It has to be remembered that the projection of a leadership model into the EU or into CFSP/CESDP/intervention force is not only politically not feasible but contradicts traditional power and decision-making patterns within the EU, which produced the high amount and intensity of cohesion, general consensus, and political attractiveness for which the EEC/EC/EU has been well-known since its beginning.

26 And which does not, for example, give its High Representative the role of a responsible and powerful executive.

27 This was illustrated in the case of the Yugoslavian conflicts.

28 Such as the conflict between Solana (European Council) and Patten (European Commission).

29 The case of the Balkan conflict, where EU Commission, EU Council, the Stability-Pact-initiative, NATO, and OSCE coexists without clearly established leadership, illustrates the problem.

30 Military effectiveness needs 3–5 years more to be reached, the date set by the Headline Goals — i.e. 2003 — has to be understood as a political date, which cannot be matched in terms of true and effective military combat readiness.

31 EUMC is heavily understaffed, underfinanced, and depends on outside information and evaluation.

32 Decisions to seek independent air transport — i.e. to buy a military Airbus version — and to build up an independent C³ + I-system — i.e. to develop and deploy satellites — have been made. It has to be seen whether and to what extent they are upheld and implemented.

33 This pattern is not new; it characterizes NATO's European members' behaviour since the 50's.

34 It characterized the traditional pro-integrationist tendency of the so-called smaller EU member states like Belgium and the Netherlands to be actively involved. Together with Germany the Netherlands belong to the architects of this initiative.

35 The European Air Group aims to build up adequate air transport capacity; the first step was the decision to set up a cell for coordinating air transport issues in June 2001. In June 2001 a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed to order about 200 transport aircrafts (type Airbus A400M) at the present price of around 15 billions € (Germany: 73 aircrafts, France: 50 aircrafts, Spain: 27 aircrafts, Great Britain: 25 aircrafts) to be delivered from 2007 onward. See *International Herald Tribune*, June 20, 2001. After Italy and Portugal have joined this initiative the total number of aircraft has risen to 212.

36 A well-known example is NATO's joint AWACS capacity.

37 For a more detailed discussion see Reimund Seidelmann, "Costs, Risks, and Benefits of a Global Military Capability for the European Union." In: *Defence and Peace Economics* Vol. 8/1997, pp. 123–145 and Reimund Seidelmann, "Entwicklungsperspektiven und -optionen für die Kompetenz-, Mittel- und Finanzverteilung zwischen EU-Institutionen/NATO und den jeweiligen Mitgliedsstaaten." *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) Berlin* 2001.

38 Here, one has to remind the reader that the "EU armament industry" rests and will rest mainly on British, French, and German plus some Italian and Spanish industries.